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TO: Saint, Rome
Saint, Salzburg
Saint, Paris
Saint, Madrid

FROM: Saint, London

SUBJECT: Translation of Statement by SOEHLING

The attached copy of the Statement by SOEHLING is

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Swedish Report

Translation of Statement handed in by SCHELLENBERG on 20.8.45

1. Q. What were your connections with the Chief of the Swedish Intelligence Service? What did you discuss with the Swedish Ambassador in Berlin?

A. In Sweden I only knew the chief of the Swedish Secret Police, Commissioner MUNAQWEST. I had with him a fairly close personal contact. During my various stays in Sweden, I met him regularly. Our conversations were always of a general political nature, and I never received any political or military information from him. He always refused the collaboration which I strove after - collaboration arising from his experiences and knowledge of Russia, on the basis of a common anti-communist attitude. He himself was particularly interested in the Japanese Information Service, apparently in order to be able to maintain a better check on its activities in Sweden.

In the military sphere CANARIS and above all BACHER also must have been in contact with the Swedish Secret Service. WROELDER and FRITZ also had contacts. I recall a conference which ROHLFEN had in Copenhagen in 1944 with some Swedish officers, at which the question was gone into as to whether it might not be possible to build up a common organization in the Baltic area, to include Estonia - Sweden; the results were to have been for the benefit of both services. The discussions did not achieve any result, but I can no longer recall the reasons why this was not possible. (It may be that FRITZ took part in these discussions).

In Berlin I discussed the the Swedish Ambassador BRICHT mainly the question of the concentration of Danish and Norwegian Internees in Neuengamme, and weighed up the possibilities of saving those under arrest by internment in Sweden for the duration of the war. In addition I spoke very frankly to him about the situation, and initiated him into my plans regarding the cessation of the war. At that time he already knew about my close contact with GRANBERG and WOTTE.

At another meeting we spoke in detail about the fight which was carrying on for the release of his countrymen who were condemned to death. He was naturally very pleased at having found me so ready to help. Much time was taken up with the discussion of German-Swedish relations, which were growing increasingly difficult with the rupture of economic relations, and above all with the cessation of ball-bearing deliveries and the possibility which was bound up with this, of the rupture of relations; a rupture which, as I had heard from HIMMLER, was being seriously considered from the German side as well.

I used all available means, and gave HIMMLER my formal promise to do everything possible, in order to avoid this, and above all to consider Sweden's interests in the Norway question, to give way in the internee question (students) and to bring to an end the criminal policies of TERBOVEN. Himmler helped in part, but KALTENBUNER was obstructive, always referring to a possible military action by Sweden against Norway, in which connection he constantly alluded to the fact of several thousand Norwegians having received military training in Sweden. All these points I reviewed in the course of a long conversation in the presence

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of General Director MOELLER, who arranged this evening meeting. He also spoke in detail and quite frankly about RIECHERT, about whom RIECHERT had considerable complaints to make, not only on account of his policy against Sweden, but also because of the quite impossible way in which RIECHERT treated the representatives of foreign countries. There can be no doubt that RIECHERT was convinced that in me he had found a silent helper. I now recall that RIECHERT had his own ideas on the release of internees, granting of visas, etc., in which I supported him to the best of my ability.

2. Q. Did Amt VI receive any results from the Finnish deciphering department?

A. I believe that KRAEMER, in Stockholm, through collaboration with the Japanese Military Attaché ONODERA, got hold of two Russian codes, which were supposed to have come from the Finnish Service. It involved (according to the evaluation of the deciphering department) in the one case - at least so I remember - a basic principle which was considered to be not very valuable but nevertheless interesting. They were still working on the other code, and here it was supposed a key which was perhaps still in use and employed by the Russian army was involved. However, this evaluation was not yet completed. The foregoing was recounted to me by GERTZ (Mil C), and it is possible that KRAEMER mentioned it to me as well. I cannot remember any other cases particularly not in connection with Amt VI. (see phraseology of the question).

3. Q. What do you know about the activities of the former Hungarian Military Attaché in Istanbul - Otto HATZ?

A. The case of HATZ is very complicated, and despite conscientious reflection I have not been able to reconstruct it. HATZ had a great deal to do with the most diverse ~~Organstellen~~ of the Secret Service. CANAHIS and HANSEN knew him personally. As regards Amt VI he latterly had contact with Dr. NOETTL. He was a very controversial personality, and I know that on his account serious difference of opinion had arisen between the individual authorities concerned, some of whom considered him absolutely reliable and valuable in his work, and others who were of exactly the opposite opinion. I think that FREUND and WARTER (KILBUR) - formerly of Sofia - in their hostile attitude opposed the opinion of the case departments. I believe that after SALAZI assumed power, HATZ was recalled and that the Hungarians themselves wanted to arrest him. Dr. NOETTL however afforded him protection. After a certain length of time HATZ took flight and deserted to the Russians. I think that it was FREUND who mentioned the matter to me stressing the fact that of course nobody had listened to him.

Either the Foreign Office or the Attaché Department were also interested in HATZ's case in the negative sense, but an inquiry from these departments was 'positively' (favourable?) replied to by VIE (NOETTL) without the production of documentary evidence. This fact annoyed FREUND greatly and he could not forget it.

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4. Q. What results did Amt VI obtain from: a) Graf DOENHOFF and
b) NICOLAI SONNENHOLZ?

A. Graf DOENHOFF was regarded as the successor of DAUFELDT in Switzerland. Diplomatically assured through his position of Consul, he succeeded in establishing himself in, I think, Zurich. This only became possible through the fact that in this case we for once really had the complete support of the Foreign Office, since DOENHOFF was a close friend of STERNGRACHT. I only met DOENHOFF when he was leaving Berlin, and this was already at a time when STEINLE and PAEMGEN were no longer in Berlin (DOENHOFF had received his training at the hands of these two). I gave DOENHOFF a fairly exact notion of my political ideas and asked him to work roughly on those lines. I think he was very surprised at me, as he had never suspected that I would speak so openly. Whether DOENHOFF ever got as far as any real activities in Switzerland is not within my knowledge. I do not even know if he got there all right. During the time of his preparation, DOENHOFF once made a report on the impossible methods employed by the State and Criminal Police in the conduct of interrogations of escaped and recaptured British prisoners of war, as well as on the bad behaviour of the guard units. The report was not very long, 1 or 2 pages. I immediately made use of it in order to speak with Oberrichter BERNER, chief of the P.O.W. department. I gave him this report of DOENHOFF's and he promised investigation and remedy. I further let WINTER know of this, and he at once demanded from BERNER a report. I had suggested this in order to keep check on BERNER. Even although I was not really concerned with such matters, in this case I felt myself bound to do everything in my power. I do not remember any other reports from DOENHOFF. Graf DOENHOFF is also the man in Switzerland whose name I could not give to Mr. Johnson.

SONNENHOLZ is a Legationsrat in the Foreign Office and member of the SS; as such he worked for some considerable time for Amt VI in an honorary capacity. He was personally acquainted with STEINLE, and this relationship had the result that SONNENHOLZ allowed STEINLE to recruit him for cooperation in a particularly binding form. Moreover SONNENHOLZ who was concerned almost exclusively with Western affairs, was a connoisseur of the French situation, and as such very useful to STEINLE. Therefore, when SONNENHOLZ went to Switzerland, he made an agreement with STEINLE that he would make him privy to his reports to the Foreign Office. In special cases, in which it seemed certain that they would not fall on very receptive ground in the Foreign Office, he would give the reports to STEINLE. Such more or less was the arrangement according to STEINLE. STEINLE must have received reports from SONNENHOLZ, both written and verbal, at least I think I remember STEINLE mentioning something like that to me. From Legationsrat REICHEL (or REICHEL) in the Foreign Office I heard one day that SONNENHOLZ was sending very interesting reports from Switzerland, from which good links might be worked up with France, via government circles. Unfortunately, these reports were all pigeon holed in the Foreign Office, and it was said that nothing could come of the, perhaps also because it appeared from the reports that in France as in other foreign countries, further developments in the SS organization was being followed with great interest, since the SS in its position of power, might one day even dissolve the party and attempt to make peace with the Western powers. I informed STEINLE

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of the position and asked him to get into contact personally with REICHEL whom he knew well, for REICHEL might possibly be able to get this report for us; moreover I hinted that I was very displeased with SOMMENHOL, and asked STEINLE to tell SOMMENHOL to come to Berlin, so that could discuss these things thoroughly with him, since I was particularly interested in these questions of high politics. REICHEL, who was going to Switzerland at this time with my tacit consent, also received from Kraemer the mission of ordering SOMMENHOL to Berlin. REICHEL, who had an especially good contact with the Swiss Embassy in Berlin and also knew leading Swiss industrialists, was to endeavour to get into touch with English circles since I hoped by that time (including the initial period which I allowed for him to establish such contact) to have got as far as to be able to offer a cessation of hostilities by Germany. I then heard no more from REICHEL, nor did I have any further contact with SOMMENHOL either.

5. Q. Did Dr. WIRSING have service links with Spain?

A. I have never heard of Dr. WIRSING having connections with Spain. I was certainly often surprised at how well he was informed on certain questions, from a general point of view; I once asked him about this - I think it was in connection with his knowledge of BIRAULT, and he replied that he had good liaison links in the political department of the Foreign Office. He was on a particularly good footing with the Envoy RAHN in Italy.

6. Q. Did you have sources of information amongst the men in Le GAULLE and BIRAULT's entourage?

A. WIRSING was always well in the picture as regards the political line of action which we suspected BIRAULT to have. I assumed that his knowledge was based firstly on his very extensive reading - (he was positively a living "Who's who") and for the rest on the Foreign Office reports examined by him. WIRSING also learned a lot about the French situation from KRAEMER, during KRAEMER's stay in Berlin, during their evening discussions on politics. But according to WIRSING, KRAEMER could only generalize on such topics.

7. Q. Did Amt VI have direct or indirect connections with the former Foreign Secretary in Spain - SERRANO SUNER?

A. Amt VI had indirect connections via BERNHARDT in Madrid with SUNER. With my approval BERNHARDT engaged SUNER as a legal adviser on matters concerning the firm and in consideration of the execution of a retainer agreement in this respect paid SUNER sums of money. I don't remember the exact amount, but I believe it was 100,000 pesetas. I consider it quite possible that BERNHARDT here, as in all his dealings, intermingled his private business interests with my own interests, for I never saw any reports from SUNER. He was also supposed to develop the link he had with Rome, and especially with the Vatican, so that I could have recourse to him if such a channel ever became necessary. I believe the Countess von WILHELM was in contact with SUNER, through the medium of her former acquaintance, Countess von WILHELM (former Spanish Ambassador to Berlin) but I do not remember if it was to MAYALIE or to SUNER that she was to make a first gift on my instructions (naturally in HIMMLER's name). However, I subsequently abandoned this plan.

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8. Q. A so-called Referat Kleinkriegsplanung was founded in 1945 by a certain Dr. SCHOEN. What do you know about it?

A. Oberfeldrichter Dr. SCHOEN was a colleague of SANDBERG's in the Zentral Bureau. Once, right at the end of the stay in Berlin, during a lull in a heavy air-raid and in front of the air raid shelter, he made a few rather confused remarks to me about this problem, of which I only remember that about eight or nine Stellen had to do with the so-called Kleinkrieg (partisan resistance) in Germany. As this problem did not interest me in the slightest, I only listened to him in a bored manner, and after a short time interrupted and reminded him that this had nothing to do with the work of the Zentral Bureau; then without further ceremony I left him. I consider it quite impossible that the relatively junior Dr. SCHOEN would thereafter have dared to try to found a Referat. Nor have I ever heard anything about such a Referat. The establishment of such a Referat would also have had to be sanctioned in writing by me, which was not the case.

9. Q. You have already mentioned something about MUELLER's radio play backs with Russia. What exactly do you know about these contacts and from where do you derive your knowledge in this matter?

A/ I heard something about Amt VI's radio play backs with Russia at a social gathering from Dr. PANZINGER for many years Gruppenleiter of IV a. KOPKOW, the authority concerned dealt in detail with the radio play backs with Russia in a long speech which he made to a large number of SS leaders at Koenigsberg at the end of 1944.

However, the most important conversation on the subject I had was with HIMMLER, who, in his suspicion that MUELLER was working for the Russians, approached me quite openly, asking if I thought it possible that MUELLER was in radio contact with the Russians. At that time I spoke very cautiously, since I had the feeling that HIMMLER's suspicion in this matter was unconfirmed and that an argument without proof would have made him suspect me of preferring a deliberate charge, which could then have been held against me.

I am personally convinced now that MUELLER's hands were not clean and that he had contact with the Russians. I can no longer recall names of agents, or the details of the various connections. In the majority of cases, however, parachute agents were involved, and they, with MUELLER's consent, established their links with Russia.

I presume that MUELLER also sent out such agents, as double agents, via Sweden and the Balkans, since he always used to say to me: "Ah, I must send you some of the foreign connections I have so that you may get to know them and will not bother them once they are out there. But only for your personal information, nothing must get into service channels". But although I kept reminding him he never brought such cases to me.

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10. Q. Write everything you know about POERZGEN, who was formerly in Tangier. Information on his last movements, his connections and his relations with KAPPLER, Amtschef IV are required. What other connections did POERZGEN have with the R.S.H.A.? Who were his friends and who his supporters?

A. I do not think I have heard the name POERZGEN. I cannot think of any contacts which might fit in answer to this question. I only know that in Amt IV, as a subsidiary Stelle of the WINZER Bureau a KOMMISSAR GUTJOHNS worked in the Consulate General in Tangier. But I cannot assume that GUTJOHNS, who was officially appointed would have called himself POERZGEN.

11. Q. Do you know anything about a certain Amt VI representative in Rome in 1942, of the name of BIERSECK? BIERSECK returned to Berlin in 1943.

A. I do not think I have ever heard of the name BIERSECK; I would have remembered it as it is a strange-sounding name. The Amt VI representatives in Rome were, as far as I can remember, Hauptsturmfuehrer ZPNER, Sturmbanfuhrer VOOS and HAUPTSturmfuehrer GROEBL. All of them were relieved of the post for some default or other, but GROEBL was later reinstated, since there was simply no one who could take his place. According to the period involved, BIERSECK might be a certain LOOS whom I surrendered from Amt VI, in I think, 1943. I had to retire LOOS on account of his dogmatic and completely inflexible attitude; he was no use to the MELDEDIENST and he himself desired to leave. I believe it was also LOOS who was going to bring an old agent of TLOO (v PETROV) back into use again, which did not occur but rather led to the arrest of this man (I have forgotten his name) thereby giving the Italian Secret Police access to documents concerning activities of the German Meldedienst, and affording them the possibility of taking active steps in the matter. KAPPLER maintained that he had seen this document, and that it had contained a great deal of incriminating material only his good connections with the Department Chief had made it possible to avoid serious misunderstanding. There is however also the possibility that I took back LOOS already in 1942 and that the incident I have just described concerns GROEBL and similarly was the cause of his retirement. I know nothing of any BIERSECK case.

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